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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
E. L. Ro:\I.XEY, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
CovEY GARAGE, a corporation, 
Defe~dant and AppellO!fl.t, 
AMERICAN EQUITABLE AssURANCE 
CoMPAXY, a corporation, 
Interpleaded Defendant 
and Respondent. 
Case No. 6243 
Btief of Respondent, E. L. Romney 
E. L. Romney brought an action to recover damages 
resulting from the theft of his car from the Covey 
Garage. The case was tried by the court sitting without 
a jury and the jndginent was in favor of the plaintiff 
for $71 :J together with costs and interest from which the 
Covey Garage has appealed. The plaintiff alleged and 
the trial con rt found the damage resulted from defend-
ant'~ negligence. 
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Prior to trial the defendant interpleaded the Amer-
ican Equitable Assurance Company and it vvas reg-
ularly served with an order of court ordering it to ap-
pear and set forth its claims, if any, against Covey 
Garage. It did not appear and the trial court in its 
judgn1ent held that it had no claim against the defend-
ant. Defendant alleged, but did not prove, that the 
American Equitable Assurance Company paid the 
plaintiff the reasonable damage to his car under an in-
surance policy, and was subrogated to his rights against 
Covey Garage. Since it was made a party to the action 
and asserted no claim against either defendant or plain-
tiff its relationship, if any, with the plaintiff is in no 
way involved here. 
On Saturday, April 30, 1938, at about 10:30 P. M., 
E. L. Romney of Lo-gan, Utah, left his car for storage 
at the· ·Covey Garage, which accepted the car for a con-
sideration to be paid and delivered a claim check to Mr. 
Romney. The attendant was requested to fill the car 
with gasoline. The keys were left in the car to enable 
the garage employee to put in the gas and park it in the 
garage. It was the practice of the garage to park the 
cars in' the garage and deliver them to the owner when 
called for. (Tr. 45-49) 
At -the time the car was left there was a dance at the 
dance hall, the entrance to the dance hall being about 20 
yards south of the entrance to the garage. There were 
a lot of· people milling around on the sidewalk in front 
of the garage. 
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About 11 :30 P. ~1. the car was stolen by a ma,n 
named Freeman and driven out of the garage and 
wrecked. ~Ir. R01nney tendered the defendant the pay-
ment for the stor.age and gasoline. (Tr. 51) 
\Yhen .Jir. Romney's car was delivered to the ga-
rage, there were three attmtdants on duty - 1Steele 
Remington, l{enneth Jones and Ben Baxter. These men 
received, parked and deliYered cars and sold gas and oil. 
The garagl' ne\·er closes. ( Tr. 55) Plaintiff's Exhilbit 
"A" (picture) sho\YS a front view of the garage which 
has two main front entrances, a wash rack and a room 
which ·has a door leading into the garage. The opening 
just south of the two main entrances is a wash rack. 
There are doors which can be closed in front of 
the wash rack. Two of the three attendants on duty at 
the garage testified they did not know whether the doors 
to the wash rack were closed or not between ten and 
eleven-thirty P. M. on the night of the theft. They did 
not know whether or not there were any cars parked in 
front of the wash rack. (Tr. 58) 
Whenever there is anybody going in the garage the 
attendants usually stop them and ask them what they 
want if they see then1. They do not usually let anybody 
in the garage who doesn't have any business in there. 
( Tr. 59) Occasionally some one starts into the garage 
and the attendants stop them. 
There i~ a rear door to the garage which is on the 
north side. The man who takes care of the government 
mail truek::; close:-; it and locks it after 10 P. M. One of 
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the boys on duty usually cheeks this door but no parti-
cular attendant has this duty. The two attendants who 
testified (Baxter and Remington) do not recall checking 
this door on the evening of April 30, 1938. (Tr. 60) 
There is an entrance that goes through the garage 
and comes -out on 5th South Street, but the door is al-
ways padlocked. The witnesses did not know whether 
this door was locked or not on the evening of April 30th. 
(Tr. 61) 
The three attendants were standing together near 
the door of the office -on the right side of the drive when 
the Romney car was driven out. Two people were in 
the front seat. There were about 115 cars stored in 
the garage that evening. Unless requested otherwise 
the keys are left in all cars. (Tr. 63) 
There was as always a line of cars parked on the 
service platfor·m just s·outh -of the wash rack-( extreme 
south in the picture). There were about 4 ears there the 
evening of April 30th. They are parked with the nose 
pointing south. The witnesses did not know ·whether 
the wash rack door was open or closed on the night of 
the theft.' 
The opening at the extreme left of the picture is a 
little room with a door in the back which is always kept 
loic:ked. (Tr. 68) The man who takes ca.re of the govern-
rnent mail trucks ha.s a key to t;.he north back door. H1 
drives the government cars in between seven and ter 
P. M. and parks them on the upper flo-or. If the attend 
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ants didn't know the people (who were going into the 
garage) and they were going clear to the back of the 
garage, we usually went with them. (Tr. 72) 
The lavatory for the garage was just inside the 
north entrance. On dance nights a number of people use 
the rest rooms at the garage----a lot of people use it who 
have no cars parked there. The attendants usually 
watched them to see where they went and to see that 
they came back out. The attendants don't stop what 
they are doing lbut they observe as closely as they can 
every one coming ·back out. There is a ladies' rest room 
and a gentlemen's rest room inside the garage. (Tr. 74) 
The man \Yho parked the government cars is named 
Slim. He is a mechanic. and worked on the ,cars during 
the evening. The garage also has a key to the north 
back entrance. It is kept on the register. T.he witnesses 
did not know who else has a key. (Tr. 77) The occupant 
of the part of the building which faces on 5th South 
Street has a key to the door which communicates between 
the garage proper and the occupant's part of the build-
ing. The witnesses did not know who had the keys to 
the door between the garage and the sales room on 5th 
South Street. It was stipulated that the witness, Ken-
neth Jones, would testify substantially as the witness, 
Steele Remington. ( Tr. 78) 
Mr. C. B. Squires testified that on the evening of 
February 26, 1938, which was Saturday, he parked his 
car at the defendant's garage and when he called for 
it the next morning it was not there, and he was told by 
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the attendant at the garage that his car had been driven 
out the previous evening. (Tr. 40) This evidence was 
material. It shows that the defendant knew that a car 
had recently been stolen from the garage. It was a cir-
cumstance to be considered by the trial court in deter-
mining whether or not the defendant exercised reason-
able care in the protection of the Romney car. 
The foregoing narration of the facts, together with 
the inferences which may reasonably be supported there-
by show ample support for the findings and judgment of 
the -trial court. They show a number of probable ways 
in which the thieves could have entered the garage, any 
one of which would support the finding of the trial court 
that the defendant was negligent. 
The evidence supports the inference that the thieves 
were able to use the cars parked at the south end of the 
service platform as a screen to shield their entrance by 
means of the wash rack door from the view of the attend-
ants. The witnesses who testified did not know whether 
or :not the door to the wash rack was closed on the eve-
ning of the theft. It had been open during the day and 
there is no evidence that it was actually closed. This 
court can not say as a matter of law that it would not 
be :negligent to permit that door to be left open or un-
locked with iCars parked so near it that persons wishing 
to enter the garage unobserved could go in behind the 
cars. On this, as well as other theories of the facts plain· 
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tiff made a prima facie case and made the decision a 
question of fact. G pon the prima facie case being 1nade 
the burden of proceeding (is distinguished frOin the ulti-
mate burden of proof) shifted to the defendant. This 
court can not say the burden thus shifted to defendant 
has been discharged by such clear and convincing testi-
mony that no reasonaible mind ;could find to the contrary. 
Let us no\Y consider the testimony regarding the 
rest room. It was located inside the garage doors and 
was used by patrons of the garage and others. The 
thieves may have gone to the rest room and. from there 
to the garage. The attendants "usually" watch people 
who go in. No particular attendant is charged with this 
duty and they do not stop what they are engaged in 
doing at the time to be sure that such persons leave the 
building after using the toilet. This evidence supports 
an inference that the thieves may have entered the ga-
rage on the pretext of using the toilet and instead of 
leaving as they entered, got into the Romney car and 
drove away. 
There is a door on the north side of the garage 
through which the government mail trucks are parked 
in the garage. The attendants who testified did not know 
whether or not this door was locked on the evening of 
the theft. The man who parked these mail trucks had 
a key to this door. He was not an employee of the garage. 
It can not be said as a matter of law that it is not negli-
gent to permit a third party to have a. key to a garage 
which holds itself out as a bailee for hire of many thou-
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sands of dollars worth of automobiles with keys in them 
so they can be driven out of the open front door. Counsel 
for defendant suggest at page 34 of their brief that the 
thief may have entered by ''entering while the post of-
fice mechaniic was running mail trucks in the back way." 
It .can not be said as a matter of law that the garage was 
not negligent in so eonducting its business that the thief 
may have entered in that manner. 
The record also shows there is. an entrance to the 
garage or storage portion of the building through the 
sales room which fronts on 5th South Street. The at-
tendants testified there was a board partition between 
this sales room and the storage room with a door through 
the partition. This door had a padlock on the storage 
side. The attendants did not know whether or not this 
door was locked on the evening of the theft. (Tr. 6~1) An 
appellate court will not hold as a matter of law that a 
garage has exercised due care when it has a door enter-
ing into the storage room from the business premises of 
a third party and the attendants on duty at the garage· 
on the evening of the theft do not know whether or not 
the door is locked on the evening of the theft. The testi-
lnony of the attendants showed that no one was parti-
cularly charged with the duty of inspecting any of the 
four entrances aside from the two main entrances to 
see if they were locked. No one was particularly charged 
with the duty of watching to see that persons who en-
tered the garage to use the toilet returned to the outside. 
No one was particularly charged with the duty of watch-
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ing to see that no trespasser used the cars parked at 
the south end of the :;erYice platfonn as a shield to screen 
an entrance by way of the wash rack door which may 
have been open on the evening· of the theft. 
This is a law case and if tliere is sufficient evidence 
to support the findings and judgment of the trial court 
they will not be distur>bed on appeal. In B. T. Morarn, 
Inc., v. First Security Corporation, 82 U. 316, 24 Pacific 
2d 384, the court said : 
''This is a law action tried to the court without a 
jury, and for that reason this court may not 
weigh the evidence and itself make findings. 
We may merely examine the record to deter-
mine whether there is sufficient competent 
evidence to support the findings of the trial 
court, and, if such is found, then it becomes 
our duty to sustain the findings.'' 
If reasonable minds could differ as to whether or not 
defendant was negligent, the judgment ·Of the trial eourt 
must be sustained. 
I. 
UNDER THE LAW APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE THE EVIDENCE 
SUPPORTS THE JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF. 
Rogers v. Murch, 149 N. E. 202, was decided by the 
.Supreme Court of Massachusetts in 1925. It was an 
artion in 'c:ontraet or tort to reeover the value of an auto-
mobile stolen from defendant's garage. A window, large 
enough when open for a person to get through the lower 
half, led to the basement of the building. There was 
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eivdence that there were locks for all the doors and win-
dows, but 
''no testimony tha·,t the windo1vs and doors on toot 
particular night were in faret locked other 
than could be inferred from evidence that it 
was the pr(J)ctice for a wif;rn;ess to lock them 
before leaving at night." 
The court said there was evidence which would warrant 
a finding that the basement window was not loeked on 
the night the theft occurred. There was a verdict for 
plaintiff in the trial court and the Supreme Court held 
that the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict 
and said: 
"The request for a ruling that 'there is no evi-
dence of negligence on the part of the de-
fendant and the plaintiff cannot recover' was 
refused rightly. In consideration of all the 
evidence and particularly of the value ·of the 
.cars which were daily housed, of the ease of 
entering the premises, and of opening the 
large door, the jury could properly find that 
reasonable care and prudence required that 
the premises should have been more securely 
safeguarded by other or additional locks, or 
if such was not feas~ble, by a night watch· 
man.'' 
The Rogers case cleari:· illustrates the ease with 
which the plaintiff in such a case establishes prima facie 
proof of negligence and casts upon the defendant the 
burden of producing evidence to rebut the prima facie 
case of the plaintiff. There it was shown to be the prac-
tice for some one to lo.ck the doors and windows before 
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leaving at night, but the court held that the nbsence of 
eddence tliat the doors and windows were in fact locked 
on the night of the theft coupled \Yith the entrance by 
the thief justified the jury in finding that the window 
'vas not locked on the night in question and that reason-
able care \\·as not exerl'ised hy defendant. 
Harding r. Shapiro, 206 K. ,r. 168 (Minnesota Su-
preme Court 19:25). The trial court, sitting without a 
jury decided in favor of plaintiff. The sliding door 
through which the thieYes gained entrance was secured 
by a three-eighths inch chain fastened by a padlock. The 
testimony for defendant showed that after the theft, 
which ·I)CCurred in the night time, the chain was found 
to :havP been cut, supposedly by a bolt cutter. The court 
said: 
"Under the rule of such cases as Hoel v. Flour 
City Fuel & Transfer Co., 144 Minn. 280, 175 
N. "~. 300, and Steenson v. Flour City Fuel 
& Transfer Co., 144 Minn. 375, 175 N. W. 
681, the lburden was upon defendant to prove 
that the loss ·of the property bailed with him 
was not the result of his negligence. As stated 
in the Hoel Case, it was not for him merely 
to go forward with the evidence, but he had 
'the burden of proving to the jury that the 
loss did not come frorn his negligence.' 
"It is a 'matter of eommon knowledge that 
burglars are accustomed to look over the 
ground of their operations in advance. Door 
and window fastenings as nearly burglar 
proof as may be are discouraging to them. 
On the other hand, insecure and easily broken 
fastenings may amount to an invitation. It 
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1s so easy to cut a three-eighths inch chain 
even though it be of steel, that it would b~ 
presumptuous for us to say as a matter of 
law that the use of such a chain, exposed as 
was this one to burglarious attack, to protect 
property stored with a bailee for hire, is due 
care as a matter of law. We consider the 
question one of fact. For that reason we 
decline to interfere with the decision for 
plaintiff. 
''Order affirmed.'' 
The Harding case presented a fact situation much 
more favorable for the defendant in that case tha'n the 
situation in the Romney case, but the court still held 
the question involved was one of fact and not of law. 
Reasonable men might believe the defendant in that case 
was negligent and it is obvious that reasonalble men 
might believe the defendant was negligent in the case 
at bar. 
Baione v. Heavey, 158 A. 181 (!Superior Court of 
PHnnsylvania 193'2). The ·rase was in trespass for neg-
ligently caring for plaintiff's automobile. Defendant 
conducted a parking lot on an unfenced vacant corner 
in Philadelphia. It was the practi>c.e to leave the keys 
in the car. Plaintiff had parked his car there forty or 
fifty times before and was familiar with the method of 
doing business. He parked his car at 9 P. M., and at 
11 P.M., when he called for it, the car could not be found. 
The defendant had seven employees beside his manager 
at work. The trial court held the defendant was negli-
ge-nt. The Superior Court affirmed this decision. 
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'"Xor have we any doubt that the evidence was 
sufficient to justify the trier of fact to find 
that defendant was negligent in the care of 
the car. \Yhen plaintiff presented the ticket, 
it was defendant's duty to obtain the car 
from the pla.ce where his employee had· put 
it, and deliver it to plaintiff; he could not 
deliver it, nor could he explain what had be-
come of it consistently with the performance 
of the duty assun1ed by him in the circum-
stances." 
Wendt v. Sley System Garages, 188 A. 624 (1Superior 
Court Pa. 1936). The plaintiff drove his car into an open 
parking lot operated by defendant. When he returned 
for it he found it had been stolen. The defendant testi-
fied that six attendants were employed and according to 
one of them four were on duty all that day until after 
the theft occurred. At times one or more of the attend-
ants were driving cars to be washed and greased which 
required them to be taken about ten !blocks. The plain-
tiff stated that when he called to get his .car, he saw only 
two attendants present on the lot. 
After quoting from the decision in B aione v. I-I eavey, 
supra, holding the question of negligence was for the 
trier of the facts, the court said: 
''This ruling is in accordance with the text in 
6 C. J. 1158, section 160, which reads as fol-
lows : 'The rule adopted in the more modern 
decisions is that the proof ·Of loss or injur~, 
establishes a sufficient prima facie case 
against the bailee to put him upon his de-
fense. Where chattels are delivered to a 
bailee in good condition and are returned in 
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a dainaged state, or are lost or not returned 
at all, the law presumes negligence to be the 
,cause, and casts upon the bailee the burden 
of showing that the loss is due to other 
eauses consistent with due care on his part.' 
We cited, with approval, this rule in O'Mal-
ley v. Penn Athletic Club, 119 Pa. Super. 
584, 181 A. 370. It is also favorably com-
mented upon by text writers. Berry on Auto-
mobiles (7th Ed.) pp. 744, 745, section 537, 
states that, if a machine is stolen while in 
the possession of a bailee, a presumption 
arises that :he was negligent in cari'ng for it, 
and all that is incumbent upon the bailor to 
make out a prima facie case is to prove the 
bailment and that the automobile was lost 
while in the Jbailee 's possession; that 'it is 
then the duty of the bailee to "go forward" 
with proof to S'how that he used proper care 
in the bailment, in the absence of which 
proof the bailor is entitled to judgment.' 
'·'The evidence offered in this case shows that the 
parking lot operated by defendant is on the 
northeast .corner of Twentieth and Market 
streets, Philadelphia, fronting 160 feet on 
Market street and running back to a depth 
of 180 feet to Commerce street, with a cap-
acity of 240 to 250 cars. The plaintiff parked 
his car, fronting Twentieth street, from which 
point a car could be driven across the pave-
ment into the street. There were 30 to 50 
cars parked, facing that way. The defend-
a'nt testified that six attendants were em-
ployed, and, according to one of them, four 
were on duty all that day prior to 5:30, but 
at times one or more of them were driving 
cars to be washed or greased, which required 
thmn to be taken a distance of a bout ten 
bl01c:ks. The plaintiff stated that, when he 
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called 'to get his car, he saw only' two attend-
ants prese·nt on the lot. 
''We are of the opinion· that the evidence was suf-
ficient to justify the trial judge in finding that 
the bailee was negligent in not exercising due 
care in safeguardi'ng the bailor's car. 
''A full consideration of this evidence and argu-
ment of learned counsel convinces us that the 
plaintiff is entitled to his judgment. 
''Judgment affirmed.'' 
In 1927 the Supreme Court of Illinois decided Bya'los 
v. Mat~heson, 159 N. E. 242~ The case in the appellate 
court is reported in 243 Ill. App. 60. Plaintiff left his 
car at defendant's garage one evening and when he called 
for it the next morning it was not there. Plaintiff and 
defendant went to the police station and reported that 
the car had· been stolen. About a week later it was 
recovered in Racine, Wisconsin. There was no other 
evidence of the negligence· of defendant. The court said 
that "so far as the· record' shows (the plaintiff) could 
have had no knowledge of the circumstances of the theft'' 
and held the plaintiff's "proof made a prima facie case" 
and affirmed the judgment for plaintiff. 
"The appellee and the appellant were t4e onl.y 
witnesses. The material facts are that Hy-
man Byalos, the appellee, kept his Velie auto-
mobile at the appellant's garage. .A!bout 7 
o'clock in the evening of January 30, 19'2'5, 
he left the .car at the garage for the night, 
and when he called for it the next morning 
it was not there. The appellant and the ap-
pellee went together to the police station to 
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take out a warrant and reported that the car 
had been stolen. 
"The appella:nt contends it was obligatory upon 
the appellee to prove the bailee was guilty of 
negligence, and that there was an entire fail-
ure to prove negligence. The appellee testi-
fied he left the car in the appellant's garage 
at 7 o'clock in the evening of January 30. He 
called for it next morning and it was not 
there. He subsequently ascertained it had 
been stolen. So far as the record shows, he 
could have had no knowledge of the circum-
stances of the theft. In the early case of 
Cumins v. Wood, 44 Ill. 416, 9·2 Am. De~c. 189, 
the court held that, where the bailor shows 
he has sto·red goods in good condition with 
the bailee and they were returned to him dam-
aged or not returned at all, the law presumes 
negligence of the bailee, unless he shows the 
loss did not result from his negligence. Schae-
fer v. Safety Deposit Co., 281 Ill. 43, 117 
N. E. 781, Ann. Cas. 1i9118C, 906; Miles v. In-
ternational Hotel Co., 289 Ill. 3·20, 124 N. E. 
599. The appellee's proof made a prima facie 
case, a:nd no proof was offered by the appel-
lant that he was not guilty of negligence.'' 
In M edes v. H ornbao.h, 6 F'ed. 2d 711, the court of 
appeals of the District of Columbia reversed the decision 
of the municipal court which held the defendant garage 
not negligent under the evidence. The appellate court 
held the plaintiff had made a prima fa~c:ie case: 
''Nevertheless, when the proof establishes that a 
stored car, while in charge of the garage 
keeper, :has been taken ·out and used by an 
emplo~yee of the latter, without the knowledge 
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or consent of the owner, and has been dam-
aged by such use, such proof, standing al_one 
unexplained, is sufficient to make out a I?r1~a 
facie case for a recovery by the plaintiff. 
Knights v. Piella, 111 Mich. 9, 60 N. W. 92,.; 
66 An1. St. Rep. 375; Hadley v. Orchard, 7 I 
Mo. App. 1-!1; Claflin v. Meyer, 75 N.Y. 260, 
31 Am. Rep. -±67 : Staley v. Colony Co. (Tex. 
CiY. App.), 163 S. \Y. 381; Colburn v. Art 
Ass 'n, 80 \Yash. 662, 141 P. 1153, L~. R. A. 
1913A, 59±; Travelers' Indemnity Co. v. 
Fa-wkes, 120 Minn. 353, 139 N. W. 703, 45 
L. R. A. (N". S.) 331; Handley v. O'Gorman, 
45 R.I. 242, 121 A. 399. 
'' \Y e think that, under the rules just stated, the 
evidence in this case made out a prima. facie 
case for a recovery by the plaintiff, and that 
it was error for the lower court to render 
judgment upon it for the defendant." 
Appellant takes the position that the ultimate burden 
of proof is on the plaintiff. Since the plaintiff assumed 
and discharged the burden of proving neglige'nce, this 
question is of no importance upon appeal. The only 
question before this court is whether or not the judgment 
finds support in the testimony. If this court decides, as 
we respectfully submit it will decide, that reasonable 
minds might differ as to whether or not defendant exer-
cised reasonable care for the protection of plaintiff's 
automobile, the judgment !below must be affirmed. 
The confusion in the cases regarding the burden of 
proof in actions like this one arises from the tenden1cy 
of some courts to attempt to decide what is really a ques-
tion of ''policy and fairness based on experience in the 
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different situations" (as stated b~' Dean Wigmore on 
Evidence, Vol. DT., Sec. 2486) by resort to a legal rule as 
a "Oe.neral solvent for. a 1l cases~" An illustration will 
clarify this point. Suppose a bailor delivers 100 cattle 
to a bailee to be grazed upon the bailee's. unfenced cattle 
range. The bailee's duty is to prevent the cattle frolll 
straying beyond the domain owned by him. When the 
cattle are returned to the bailor at the end of six months 
5 head are missing. In a suit by the bailor it seems 
obvious that the mere fact of disappearance of tbe cattle 
while in the technical possession of the bailee would not 
create any presumption of negligence. And if the cattle 
had been stolen from a range covering thousands of acres. 
the situation with regard to !burden of proof should be 
the same. The plaintiff should :have the burden of show-
ing some additional facts to create a prima facie case 
and shift to defendant bailee the burden of showing .due 
care. 
But when a bailor delivers an automobile to a large 
modern garage, enclosed in a building· with three attend-
ants and pays a fee to have it protected and a thiefenters 
the building presumably while the atte-ndants are on: dut~' 
and drives the car away and wrecks it, considerations of 
''fairness based on experience'' should properly hold the 
plaintiff has made a prima facie .case and the burden of 
rebuttal then shifts to the bailee.· The fact of the theft 
of the bailed property may or may not rebut the prima 
fEicie case created by the bailment and the failure tore-
turn, depending upon the facts of the bailment and 'the 
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facts of the theft. The purpo~e of a trial is to establish 
justice :between the parties, and under the spirit of the 
code pleading reforms abolishing foi~ms of aetion, it is 
a sacrifice of substance to mere form to answer the ques-
tion of burden of proof by resort to the form of the 
action-whether in contract or tort. 
Counsel for appellant quote at length from 81cain v. 
Ttciu City 1llotor Co., 127 S. E. 560. The court there held 
the defendant had the burden of the evide-nlce-that is 
that the fact of the theft while in the cu-stody of ·the 
bailee made a prima facie case for plaintiff. The defend-
ant discharged its burden by proving the theft occurred 
without its negligence. The court said: 
''The general prindple g-overning liability as pro-
nounced in this state is contained in Beck v. 
\Yi1kins..!Ricks Co., 179 N. C. 231, 102 S. E. 
313, 9 A. L. R. 554, as follows: 'The defend-
ant as bailee assumed liability of ordinary 
care for the safekeeping and the return of 
the machine to the bailor in good condition. 
The bailee did not assume liability as in-
surer, a·nd therefore did not bec.ome lia!ble for 
the nonreturn of the property in good condi-
tion if he observed the ordinary care de-
volved upon him by reason of the baiJ.ment. 
If the machine had been injured or stolen or 
destroyed by fire while in his custody, the 
defendant would not be liable if such care 
had been observed. On the other hand, the 
mere fact fha'f the property had been. de-
stroyed by fire or stolen did not absolve him 
front resp{)lnsibil ity, any more than he would 
. have been absoh·ed 'if it had been injured in 
his custody, Ulnless he had shown that he had 
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us~d the care required of him by virtue of his 
ba.~lment. * * "'' 'The rule adopted in the 
more modern decisions is that the proof of 
loss or injury establishes a sufficient prima 
f~.cie case against the bailee to put him upon 
h1s defense. Where chattels are delivered 
to a bailee in good condition and are returned 
in a damaged state, or are lost or not re-
turned at all, the law presumes negligence 
to be the cause, and casts upon the bailee the 
burden of showing that the loss is due to 
other causes consistent with due care on hiR 
part.' " See Ha:nes v. :Shapiro, 168 N.C. 24, 
84 S. E. 33; Hutchins v. Taylor Buick Co., 198 
N. C. 777, 153 S. E. 397. 
''Practically all courts are in a~ccord upon the 
proposition t'hat if the owner of an automo-
bile carries it to a garage in good condition, 
for service furnished by such garage, and 
thereafter such bailee fails to return it, or 
returns it in a damaged cundition, he makes 
out a prima facie case, nothing else appear-
ing, and is therefore entitled to have the jury 
determine the proper issues. But, suppose 
it should appear from the plaintiff's evideme. 
or if the fact ·was uncontroverted, that while 
in such garage tbe ear was struck by light-
ning or the employees of the garage were 
held up by an armed highwayman and the 
~car was taken from the custodv of the bailee, 
·who was otherwise exercising"ordinary care, 
it would hardly be supposed that under such 
circumstances the law required the solemn 
formality of submitting issues upon such ad-
mitted facts." · 
T:he Swain case cites the following North Carolina 
cases and in each it is held the bailee has the burden of 
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the evidence upon proof of the loss. None of them base 
this ruling upon the form of the pleading. 
Beck v. ll"ilkins-Ri.cks Co., 102 S. E. 313; 
Hanes v. Shap·iro, 8-! S. E. 33; 
Hntchins v. Taylor Buick Co., 153 S. E. 3917. 
The court in the Beck case, supra, quotes the follow• 
ing from 6 Corpus Juris, Section 160: 
''Reasons of Rule.-(1) '.Since the bailor is gen-
erally at a disadvantage in olbtainlng accurate 
information of the cause of the loss or dam-
age, the law considers he makes out a case 
for the application of the rule of res ipsa 
loquitur by proof of the bailme:nt and the fail-
ure of the bailee to deliver the property on 
proper demand.' Corbin v. Cleaning Co., 181 
Mo. App. 1'51, 155, 167 S. W. 1145. (2) 'The 
rule rests upon the consideration that, where 
the ·bailee has exclusive possession, the facts 
attending loss or injury must be peculiarly 
within his own knowledge. Besides, the fail-
ure to return the property, or its return in 
an injured condition, constitutes the viola-
tion of a contract, and it devolves upon the 
bailee to excuse or justify the breach.' Nutt 
v. Davison, 54 Colo. 586, 588, 13;1 Pa1c. 391, 
44 L. R. A. (N. S..) 1170. (3) 'The rule is 
founded in necessity and upon the presump-
tion that a party who, from his situation, has 
peculiar, if not exclusive, knowledge of facts, 
if they exist, is best able to prove them. If 
the bailee, to whose possession, control and 
care of the goods are intrusted, will not ac-
count for the failure or refusal to deliver 
them on demand of the bailo-r, the presump-
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tion is not violent that 'he has been wanting 
in diligence, or that he may have wrongfully 
converted or may wrongfully detain them; 
or if there be injury to or loss of them during 
the bailment, it is but just that he be required 
to show the circumstances, acquitting him-
self of the want of diligence it was his dutv 
to bestow.' Davis v. Hurt, 114 Ala. 146, 150, 
21 South. 469·, 'quoted in Hackney v. Perry, 
152 Ala. 6'2·6, 44 S.outh. 1029, 1031. '' 
The very recent ·California case of Travelers Fire 
Insura;nce Co. v. Brock wnd Co .. , 85 .Pac. 2d 905 .(District 
Court of Appeal-hearing denied by Supreme Court Feb. 
20, 1939), contains the foHowing terse statement of the 
rule: 
''The :burden of proof rests with .the bailee to 
prove, where ~he bailed property is not re-
turned to the bailor, that the property was 
lost by theft, etc., without negligence ·Of the 
bailee. U Drive & Tour, Ltd., v. System Auto 
Parks, Ltd., Cal. Super., 71 P. 2d 3·54, 356." 
The proof of t'l~eft of bailed property may or may 
not shift the burden or' the evidence from the bailee back 
t·o the ·bailor, depending upon all the facts and circum-
stances .. U:nder the facts in the case at bar the fact of 
the theft in view of all the other facts in evidence created 
a prima facie case for the plaintiff and shifted the bur-
den of the evidence to the defendant. If the case had 
been tried before a jury, plaintiff "~as entitled to go to 
the jury. The evidence sustains the judgment which 
should be affir:rp.ed .by the court. 
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As shown by the cases herein there is sulbstantial 
and respertable authority for the eontention that upon 
proof of bailment and failure to return the ultimate bur-
den ,of proof shifts to the bailee. Since the evide-nce in 
the case at bar supports an inferenc.e of negligence the 
question of whether or not the ultimate burden of proof 
shifts is not here involn:-d. All the cases, including those 
cited by appellant agree upon the proposition that evi-
dence of the circumstances shown in the case at bar create 
a prima facie case and shift the burden of proceeding to 
the bailee. Or stated in another way, such evidence sup-
ports a judgment for the bailor. 
Counsel for appellant cite Galo1citz v. Magner, 203 
X. Y. S. 421. The California District Court of Appeals 
in Beetson v. Hollywood Athletic Club, 29·3 Pa1c:. 821, 
quote with approval from the Magner case the following: 
"It seen1s to me obvious that plaintiff had the 
right to believe, from the fact that defend-
ant maintained an inclosed space for park-
ing cars, W'ith an entrance and exit and at-
tendants, that he was paying the parking fee 
in consideration of care and watchfulness to 
prevent injur~ or loss. Otherwise he might 
almost as well have parked upon the public 
street and saved the fee. * * * 
"The proof in this case is very meager, but is in 
n1y opinion sufficient to present a question 
of fact for the jury. Where a space is in-
closed by an 8-foot !board fence, for parking 
cars, with an entrance and an exit, a check-
ing system, and three attendants to look after 
and take care of the cars as they ca!me in and 
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went out, the jury might infer that the theft 
of plaintiff'!:3 car could not have occurred had 
defendant and his employees properly per-
formed their duty. Indeed, it seems to me 
that such inference is well-nigh irresistible, 
ber.ause some one must have taken out plain-
tiff's car without presenting a check or ticket 




The judgment in the Magner case was set aside and 
remanded for new tri~l upon the ground the complaint 
failed to allege negligence and because the trial court 
instructed the jury that the burden rested upon the de-
fendant to show that the theft did not occur through 
want of due care on his part. This holding is criticized 
hy the author of the note in 48 A. L. R. 385: 
"It seems fairly open to question whether the in-
terpretation which the court _put upon the in-
struction in the last .c:ase is the correct one, as 
placing· the burden of proof of due care on 
the defendant. Rather, the contention seems 
plausible that this instruction merely re-
quired the defendant to produce evidence to 
overcome a prima facie case arising from the 
loss of the property. It is said that the com-
plaint alleged, and the answer admitted, ~y 
not denying, that the car was stolen. ~ut l_ll 
case of theft of property from the ba1lee; 1f 
the theft is admitted it seems that the ba1lee 
ought to be requirea' to show the care wh~ch 
he exercised to prevent the theft, assu~mg 
that, after he overcomes the plaintiff's prnna 
fa•cie case, the ultimate burden of proof rest.s 
on the plaintiff, the bailor, to prove negli-
gence.'' 
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The plaintiff, in J{cenau llotel Co. v. Ji'unk,111 N. E. 
364, alleged a bailment of hi~ automobile at a public park-
ing lot operated by defendant and that through defend-
antts negligence it was stolen. The court, sitting without 
a jury found the issues in favor of the plaintiff. The 
evidence showed the !bailee required the bailor to leave 
the keys in the car and said he would watch it. There 
was no proof of "specific" negligence. T:he appellate 
court held the bailor had established a prima facie ease 
and affirmed the judg1nent for the bailor. 
''This court will not weigh the evidence where it 
is conflicting. If there is any evidence tend-
ing to support every essential fact necessary 
to sustain the judgment, it is sufficient. It 
is also the rule, that the court or jury trying 
the cause may draw any reasonable inference 
of fact :(rom the evidence. It is not essential 
that a fact be proven by direct and positive 
eYidence, but, where it may reasonably be 
inferred from the facts and circumstances 
whii(~h the evidence tends to establish, it will 
be sufficient on appeal. Federal, etc., Co. v. 
Sayre (1924), 19:5 Ind. 7, 142 N. E. 223. It is 
only when there is no evidence on some es-
sential element to sustain the judgment, or 
to sustain any reasonable inferences in sup-
port thereof that this court would be justi-
fied in reversing a cause for want of evi-
dence. Emerson, etc., Co. v. Tooley (19·23), 
81 Ind. App. 460, 141 N. E. 890." . 
'·'Where the burden of proof rests in cases of 
this kind is a question upon vvhich the courts 
are not in harmony. The rule in Indiana 
however, a portion of '~lhich was quoted with 
approval from the case of Miles v. Interna-
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tional Hotel Co. ( 1919), 289 Ill. 320, 1'24 N. E. 
599, was very plainly set forth in this lan-
guage: ' ''The weight of modern authority 
holds the rule to be that, where the bailor has 
sho\Yll that the goods were received in good 
condition by the bailee and were not returned 
to the !bailor on demand, the bailor has made 
out a case of prima facie negligence against 
the bailee, and the bailee n1ust show that the 
loss or damage was caused \vithout ~his fault. 
* * * The effect of this rule is, not to 
shift the burden of proof from plaintiff to 
the defendant, but simply the burden of pro-
ceeding.'' And such prima facie case is not 
overcome by a showing on the part of the 
bailee that the goods have been burned, or 
otherwise destroyed or stolen. Before such 
prima facie case Qan be said to be overcome, 
the bailee must further produce evidence 
tending to prove that the loss, damage, or 
theft was occasioned without his fault. This 
rule has been applied to garage keepers who 
failed to return automobiles on demand.' 
Employers', etc., Co. v. Consolidated, etc., 
Co. (19,27), 85 Ind. App. 674, 155 N. E. 535, 
and authorities there cited. 
"From an examination of the evidence in the rec-
ord, keeping in mind the above rules as a 
test of its suffi~iency to support the judg-
ment, we do not find that there is a total want 
of eviden<;e on any essential element neces-
sary to make appellee's case. 
''Judgment affirmed.,., 
In H·oel v. Flour City Fuel d!; Tra11sjer Co., 175 N. W. 
300, the court said and held: 
"In Rustad v. Great N. Ry. Co., 122 Minn. 453, 
142 N. \V. 727, \Ve had the question of the 
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liability of the railway company defendant as 
a warehouseman for the loss of property in 
its possession. ": e held that the burden of 
proof was upon the defendant to shnw that 
the loss did not con1e from its negligence; 
that this !burden was not merely the burden 
of going forward with proofs, nor a shifting 
burden, but a burden of establishing before 
the jur: that its negligence did not eause the 
loss; and we referred with approval tn Dean 
Wigmore's statement that the question of 
where the burden of proof should rest is 'a 
question of policy and fairness based on ex-
perience in the different sitnations.' '' · 
''The evidence was not such as to· require a find-
ing that it was free of negligence and that the 
loss did not come from its lack of care. The 
evidence was only this, that the· defendant 
could give no explanation of how the car go~ 
out of the garage. The jury, taking into con-
sideration the manner in which the garage 
was conducted, could find that if ca:re eom-
mensurate with the situation had been used 
it would not have disappeared." 
In Federal Insurarn~e Co. v. Lindsley, 2·28 N; Y. S. 
614, the court said: 
''While the dismissal of the complaint seems ,,-ar-
ranted by the opinion in Claflin v. Meyer, 75 
N. Y. 260, 31 Am. Rep. 467, it was subsequ-
ently held in Ouderkirk v. Central Nat. Bank 
of Troy, 119 N. Y. 263, 23 N. E. 875, that the 
burden of showing the circumstances of the 
loss of the property rests upon the bailee, and 
unless the evidence shows the exercise of due 
care by him according to the nature of the 
bailment he \vill be held responsible for the 
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breach of his contract to return the property 
bailed, and in Stewart v. 'Stone, 127 N. Y. 
500, 28 N. E. 59'5, 14 L·. R. A. 215, that the 
prima facie case made out hy failure to re-
turn the property bailed on demand may be 
over1come, when it is made to appear that the 
loss was occasioned by some misfortune or 
accident not within the control of the bailee. 
See, also, Greenberg v. Mermelstein (.Sup.), 
188 N. Y. S. 2150; Hobbie v. Ryan, 130 Misc. 
Rep. 221, 2:23 N. Y. 18. 654. It follows that the 
mere concession that the automobile was 
stolen from defendant's garage did not de-
stroy plaintiff's prima facie case, and it was 
error to dismiss the complaint.'' 
In Fisher v. Bonneville Hotel Co., 188 P~c. 856, 55 
U. 588, where the plaintiff sued for negligently failing to 
care f.or plaintiff's baggage, and on the assumption that 
the plaintiff \Vas a boarder to whom the duty of ordinary 
care was due, this court held the evidence sustained the 
finding and judgment for plaintiff. The evidence shorwed 
merely that the plaintiff handed the grip to one of the 
porters which was the last she ever saw of it. The hotel 
manager charged the porters with being careless in re-
spect to the property. 
'''rCertainly this court, in view of such evidence 
can not find that the evidence was insuffi-
cient to support the finding.'' 
Counsel for appellant cite Knights v. Piella! 69 N. 
W. 9'2, decided by the Supreme Court of Michigan in 
1896. In 1931 the same· court decided General Excha'fbge 
Insura;n:ce Corpora1tion v. Service Parking Grounds, Inc., 
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235 N. "'· 898. In 1919 the Mi,chigan legislature enacted 
the following statute: 
''.Section 1. \YheneYer any damage s~all be done 
to anY motor vehicle while in the possession 
or un.der the eare, custody or control of the 
owner, his agent or servant, or the k~eper of 
any public garage or other establishment 
where such vehicle shall have been accepted 
for hire or gain, proof of such damage s·hall 
be prima facie evidence that sueh damage 
was the result of the negligent act of such 
owner or keeper of the plaee where such 
vehicle was stored.'' 
The court said this statute 1s declaratory of the 
common law and held: 
''The burden was on defendant not only to show 
that the ·ear was stolen ,but also that the theft 
took place without any negligence on its 
part.'' 
The court cites and quotes from prior case of 
Kn·ights v. Piella in support of its position ~hat while 
the ultimate burden of proof is on the plaintiff the burden 
of the evidence (overcoming plaintiff's prima facie case) 
shifts to defendant. It is further held that the judgment 
for defendant below found no support in the evidence 
which showed negligence as a matter of law and ordered 
judgment for plaintiff. 
Counsel for appellant cite Stone v. Case, 124 Pa,c. 
g,60. That case is reviewed in the later Oklahoma case 
of Wheeler r. Packard OklJahoma Motor Co., 38 Pac. 2d 
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943. Analysis of these' cases illustrates that the rule 
therein announced is simply that the~ plaintiff' has thi 
burden of establishing a prima facie case. If this prima 
facie case is rehutted by uncontradicted testimony S() 
strong that reasonable minds could not differ about it 
the defendant is entitled to a directed verdict. (As in 
the Swain case, supra, and ·cited by appellant.) If the 
rebuttal is itself only prima facie and reasonable minds 
may differ as to what is proved the plaintiff without 
further evidence is entitled to go· to the jury. In the last 
situation the jury would be properly instructed that the 
ultimate burden of proof is on the plaintiff. 
Carefully considered, appellant's argument regard-
ing the burden of proof amounts to no more than an 
argument that if the case had been tried before a jury 
the defendant would have been entitled to an instruction 
tha:t the burden of satisfying the jury upon the question 
of negligence \Yas upon the plaintiff. Suppose the de-
fendant admits this proposition for the purpose of the 
argument. The jury (the Judge in this case) was prop-
erly advised as to the• law and was satisfied by the pre-
ponderance of the evidence. The only· question ibefore 
this court comes baclc to the same proposition: Could 
reasonable mi11ds reach the ~conclusion reached by the 
trial court. 
There is, however, as shown ·herein substantial and 
respectable authority for the eontention that if plaintiff 
creates a prima facie case which is not rebutted by de· 
fendant the ultimate burden of satisfying the jury bas 
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been shifted to the defendant. "\Vhile plaintiff respL•d-
fully submits that his testimony created such a prima 
facie case and there was no rebuttal by defendant tend-
ing- to show the exereise of ordinary care, and the plain-
tiff would therefore under the authority referred to have 
been entitled to an instruction that the burden was on 
defendant to prove freedom from negligence, since the 
trial \Yas to the .court the question involved here on ap-
peal is properly limited to the question of whether or not 
the evidence supports the judgn1ent. 
In Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. Altmont Sprilngs 
Hotel Co., 267 .S. W. 555, the Court of Appeals of Ken-
tucky held: 
'' vV e think these facts developed a prima facie 
case of negligence ag-ainst defendant, and that 
the burden was upon it to show the requisite 
care on its part to excuse it from liability.·'' 
The evidence showed the storage of the automolbile 
in defendantts garage and its disappearance therefrom 
during the nig~ht. The keys to the garage were in the 
possession of defendant and it permitted its servants, 
as well as other boarders, lodgers and guests, to use 
those keys. In the case at bar the defendant permitted 
the man who took care of the government mail trucks to 
have keys to the noTth rear door of the garage. The 
above case is followed in Blackbu.rn. v. Depoyster, 272 
S. W. 398, decided by the same court and in Spare v. 
Belroy Housing Corpora!tion, 38 Pac·. 2d 207, decided by 
the Supreme Court of Washington. See H utohins v. 
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Taylor Buick Co., 153 8. E. 397; Employers Fire Ins. 
Co. v. Consolidated Garage, 155 N. E. 533; Farrell Cal-
houn Co. v. U11ion Chevrolet Co., 113 S. W. 2d 419. 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPEHLY OVERRULED DEFENDANT'S 
GENERAL AND SPECIAL DEMURRERS TO PLAINTIFF'S 
COMPLAINT. 
Defendant's special demurrer was directed to the 
sound discretion of the court. Obviously the manner in 
which the thief entered defendant's garage was not 
known by the plaintiff. The plaintiff is not required to 
plead the evidence by which 'he establishes the ultimate 
fact of negligence. 
Plaintiff's complaint alleged: 
"That the defendant negligently and carelessly 
failed to safel~- and securely keep said auto-
mobile but carelessly and negligently per-
mitted the same to be taken and stolen from 
said garage by Albert Freeman and Brady 
1Vayne Poulson without the consent or au-
thority or permission of the plaintiff or an~·­
one acting on his behalf." 
The garage and the .car were in defendant's posses-
sion. Its employees on duty at the time the car wa~ 
stolen testified "I haven't the slightest idea how Free-
man and ·whoever was with him got inside the garage 
that night. We have all been wondering and speculat-
ing as to how he got in.'' An argument that the plaintiff 
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must allege and prove the specific manner in which the 
thief got into defendant's garage when the defendant 
itself, in possession of the garage, asserts H does not 
know, defeats itself. All available facts were within the 
knowledge and possession of the defendant. 
The trial court's ruling on the special den1urrer will 
not the reversed on appeal where, as here, the ruling did 
not constitute an abuse of discretion and did not affect 
the substantial rights of the adverse party. 
The Utah statute provides: 
"104-13-1. Pleadings to be Liberally Oon-
strued. In the construction of a pleading, 
for the purpose of determining its effect, its 
allegations must be liberally construed with 
a view to substantial justice between the 
parties.'' 
'''104-14-7. Only Prejudicial Errors and Defects 
To Be Regarded. The court must in every 
stage of an action disregard any error or de-
fect in the pleadings or proceeding which does 
not affect the substantial rights of the parties, 
·and no judgment shall be reversed or af-
fe.cted by reason of such error or defect.'' 
'' 104-39-3. Prejudice Must Be Shown. No ex-
ception shall be regarded, unless· the decision 
excepted to is material and prejudicial to the 
substantial rights of the party excepting.'' 
In support of our position that the trial court did 
TI'Ot err in overruling defendant's general demurrer we 
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534: 
''Under our system, the allegations of a pleadinO' 
for the purpose of determin~ng its effect' 
must be liberally construed, with a view t~ 
suhstantial justice between the parties. Camp. 
Laws Utah 1888, Sec. 32.38. Nor can fhe ob-
jection to the complaint that the allegations 
respecting the defective machinery and its 
negligent operation were in general terms 
avail the appellant. While these allegations 
do not refer specifie1ally to the particular 
parts of the machinery which were defective, 
or specify with exactness wherein tbe ma-
chinery was operated carelessly, still we are 
of the opinion that they would have been suf-
ficien.t to resist a general demurrer before 
trial, if one had been interposed, and hence 
are sufficient to resist the attack that the 
complaint did not state a cause of action, 
made after verdict and judgment. * * * 
Moreover, it does not appear that the plain-
tiff had such exact knowledge of the machin-
ery and its operation as would enable him to 
state just what particular parts were defec-
tive, or just wherein its operation was neg-
ligent. The general facts he could know, but 
the particular facts were more likely to be 
within the knowledge of the defendant, be-
cause of its duty to inspect the machinery 
and keep it in repair. In such case less part-
icularity in stating the specific facts, or th.e 
acts or on1issions w'hich .constitute negli· 
gence, is required. The .complainant may 
know only the immediate cause of the injury, 
and may be unable to state the precise acts 
or things which caused it. If, therefore, the 
facts alleged show such an occurrence as is 
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usually the sequence of en reh'SSIJr•s:-:; or n~g·­
li()'ence, it is incumbent upon the opposite ~ . f party to explain it, and show the exeW'Ise o 
proper care : and the court in sue·h case will 
not say, as matter of law, that the complaint 
does not state a cause of action on the ground 
of negligence.'' 
And in Eddi11gfon r. Cement Co., -!:2 U. 274, 130 Pac. 
243, the court said : 
"Unless it is clear that the complaint fails to 
state some essential element necessary to a 
cause of action, or that some facts are stated 
by reason of which the plaintiff cannot re-
cover because of some a,ct of his own, which 
prevents a reeovery, a general demurrer 
should always be overruled. Under our stat-
ute (Gomp. Laws 1907, sec. 2986) doubts, if 
any arise, upon the allegations in the plead-
ings are not necessarily resolved against the 
pleader; but the pleading, as provided in that 
section, 'must be liberally construed.' No 
reason is perceived why appellant cannot 
prove a prima facie case under the allega-
tions of his complaint.'' 
In Roster v. Inter-State Power Co., 237 N. W. 738, 
the Supreme Court of North Dakota held: 
"It is the settled rule that negligence may be set 
forth in general terms, where the specific 
facts are more largely within the knowledge 
of the defendant. 8 R. C. L. 812; Bliss on 
Code Pleading Sec. 310a : New York, C. & 
St. L. Ry. Co. v. Callahan, 40 Ind. App. 223, 
81 N. E. 670; Stolle v. Anheuser-Busch, 307 
Mo. 520, 271 S. \V. 497, 39 A. L. R. 1001; 
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Tietke v. Forrest, 64 Cal. App. 364, 221 P. 
681.'' 
In Schaff v. Coyle, 249 Pac. 947, the supreme Court 
of Oklahon1a held the trial .court did not abuse its dis-
cretion in overruling defendant's motion to make plain-
tiff's petition more definite and certain: 
''For reversal, it is first insisted that the trial 
.court erred in overruling defendant's motion 
to require the plaintiffs to make their peti-
tion more definite and certain. Motions to 
make more definite and certain are addressed 
to the .sound dis-cretion of the trial court, and 
where, as in this case, the information sought 
to be ohtained thereby is within the knowl-
edge of the defendant, and can be obtained 
from records, train sheets, switch lists, re-
ports, and other documentary evidence, kept 
by the defendant, s'howing the mo.vement of 
its various trains and engines, this court can-
not say that the trial court abused its dis-
cretion in overruling such action. City of 
Lawton v. Hills, 53 Okla. 243, 153 P. 297; Ft. 
Smith & Western R.y. Go. v. Ketis, 26 Okla. 
696, 110 P. 616·1; Landon v. Morehead, 34 
Okla. 701, 126 P. 1027; City of Chickasha v. 
Looney, 36 Okla. 155, 129 P. 136; Frey v. 
F1ailes, 37 Okla. 297, 1312 P. 342." 
III. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY HELD THAT THE AMERICAN 
EQUITABLE ASSURANCE COMPANY HAD NO CLAIM 
AGAINST COVEY GARAGE. 
At page 44 of appellant's brief it is stated that ''it 
was stipulated (Ab. 11) that the American Equitable As· 
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surance Company paid to plaintiff under a collision 
coverage polic.y, the amount of his loss under the policy.'' 
The so-called stipulation w'hich was little more than an 
argument is found at pages 35-38 of the record. Mr. 
Stewart stated that the amount paid by American Equit-
ble Assurance Company to Mr. Romney ''is substantially 
less than the amount we have stipulated should be re-
covered in the event there is a recovery.'' Plaintiff ob-
jected to the n1ateriality of the proposed stipulation and 
the court never ruled on the objection, and plaintiff did 
not stipulate that the insurance company had paid any-
thing to Mr, Romney. 
But assuming that the insurance company had paid 
a portion· of plaintiff's loss, there is no error in the 
judgment for plaintiff. It must be observed that the 
American Equitable Assurance Company is a party de-
fendant in the action. It was served with an order of 
the •cDurt requiring it to ''appear and set forth its rights 
and daims, if any, against defendant Covey Garage.'' 
It did not file any pleading or assert any claim. It is, 
therefore, idle to review the cases or discuss the question 
of whether or not it is a necessary party. 
And when the insurance company is made a party 
to the action it is obviously not prejudicial to the de-
fendant Covey Garage that it asserts no claim against 
that defendant. 
/Such is the doctrine clearly stated in Potomac Insu.r-
aucc Co. v. Nickson, 64 U. 395, 231 Pac. 445, where the 
.eourt said : 
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''Plaintiff was lia·ble t(} Vvallace, and paid the loss 
and damage he sustained by reason of the 
defendant's breach of duty, that is, by reason 
of his wrongful delivery of the car to Wei-
Q_ers. Nor is it controlling that the plaintiff 
was liable only in case of theft and not for 
misdelivery. That was the effect of the 
contract as between the plaintiff and Walla~. 
With that the defendant is not concerned ex-
cept that he has a right to be protected 
ag-ainst paying the loss to more than one 
claimant. As to that he is fully protected 
both by the proof of the assignment by Wal-
lace to fhe plaintiff and also by the fact tha.t 
plaintiff paid the loss to Walla,ee and was 
subrogated to his rights as against the de-
fendant.'' 
With the relationship between Romney and the in-
surance company the Covey Harage is "not concerned'' 
and the judgment protects it against "paying the loss 
to more than one claimant.'' 
IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY OVERRULED DE-FENDANT'S 
OBJECTIONS TO THE TESTI!MONY OF THE WI'IINESS 
SQUIRES THAT HIS CAR HAD BEEN STOLEN FROM THE 
COVEY GARA:GE ON FEBRUARY 26, 1938. 
The testimony of Mr. Squires was admissible to 
show notice to defendant that on a Saturday night about 
two months prior to the theft of the Romney ca.r, thr 
Squires car had been stolen from the garage. Whether 
or not the prior theft had resulted from negligence was 
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not in issue in this ease and the prior t lwft was no tiel' 
regardless of whether or not it wa~ lll'g;ligently per-
mitted 'by the bailee. H u.rd r. U. P. Ry. Co., 8 Utah 241, 
30 Pac. 982, is cited by appellant. 
This court clearly illustrates the distinction here 
involved when it stated: 
·' \Y e think the ruling of the district court was 
correct, and was not in conflict with the case 
of District of Colu.mbia v. Armes, 107 U. S. 
5:24, :2 Sup. -Gt. R,ep. 840, as contended by 
counsel for appellant. That was a case to 
recover dan1ages for injuries from a fall, 
caused by a defective sidewalk in the city of 
\V ashington. The sidewalk had been left in 
an unguarded and dangerous condition, and 
the court held that plaintiff might show that 
while it was in that condition other like ac-
cidents had oecurred at the same place, for 
the reason that it tended to show the danger-
ous character of the place; and that, from 
the publicity neeessarily given such accidents, 
it tended also to show that the citv authori-
ties had notice of the dangerous ch-aracter of 
the locality. If testimony, however, had been 
offered that other people had fallen on other 
sidewalks in the city, we think the court would 
not have held it admissible." 
The Supreme Court of California, in McCormick v. 
Great Western Po·wer Co., 8 P. (2d) 145, stated the rule 
as follows: 
''Furthermore, it is held in this state that, for 
the purpose of proving that one who main-
tains a dangerous instrumentality might· 
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reasonably anticipate that persons eng-aO'ed 
in lawful occupations, in places where they 
~ave a legal right to be, are likely to be in-
Jured thereby, evidence of previous accidents 
similar in character to the one in question 
and not too remote therefrom in place or point 
of time, is admissible. Long v. John Brenner 
Co., 36 Cal. App. 630, 172 P. 1132, 1136; Gor-
man v. County of Sacramento, g2 Gal. App. 
656, 268 P. 1083, 1087; Dyas v. Southern Paci-
fic Co., 140 Cal. 2g·6, 73 P. g72. In the Long 
Case, in holding that evidence of similar ac-
cidents was admissible, the court said: '\Ye 
think the evidence was admissible upon the 
general proposition that testimony of previ-
ous accidents similar to the one in question 
not only tends to show the dangerous chara~­
ter of the place, but, where the previous acd-
dents have occurred under substantially the 
same general circum·stances of the subsequ-
ent accident, tends to disclose the cause of 
the latter, and, furthermore, tends to bring 
home to the person maintaining the place 
where the in•jury occurred knowledge of t~e 
dangerous condition of such plaice.' And m 
the Gorman Case the following language was 
used:' Appellant next contends that the court 
erred in permitting respondent to introduce 
evidence that other accidents had occurred 
at thi~ bridge; that is, that at least four auto-
mobiles had fallen off of this bridge into t1Je 
canal prior to the time the boy was drowned. 
We think the evidence was properly admitted 
as tending to show the dangerous character 
of the bridge and the cause of the boy'~ 
death, and furthermore, 1t tends to bring 
home to appellant knowledge of the dan~er­
ous condition of said bridge.' '' 
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And in Sar.rJcnt r. Cuion Fuel Co., :~7 Utah i~~l:~, 10~ 
P. 928, the Supren1e Court of Utah said: 
''()yer defendant's objections, plaintiff was per-
mitted to sl!ow that rock and earth had fallen 
from the roof of the tunnel at different times 
prior to the accident, and at places other than 
the place of the accident. vV e see no error in 
these rulings. :Such evidence was admissible 
as tending to show the character of the 
ground, the necessity of timbering or other-
wise supporting the roof, and notice to t11e 
defendant of the defectiYe and dangerous 
conditions.'' 
Osplind v. Pea.rce, 221 N. W. 679 and Marnson v. 
Mays Department Stores Co., 71 S. W. (2d) 1081, an-
nounce the same rule. The question involved is answered 
in the cases by an appeal to common sense. Does the 
proof of the prior occurrence tend to show or support . 
an inference that the defendant was negligent on the 
occasion in question. \Ye believe that if the evidence 
showed that a car was stolen from defendant's garage 
every Saturday night for two months that even the ·de-
fendant would admit it was not exercising due care. 
The illustration differs from the facts here only in degree 
which goes to the weight and not the. admissibility. 
Under its assignment of error No.6 appellant argues 
that an agent has no authority, after an event or trans-
action has occurred to make admissions on behalf of his 
principal, and that the testimony of Mr. Squires as to 
the prior theft was therefore hearsa'y and inadmissible. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
42 
Mr. Squires testified that he parked his car on Sat-
urday night and when he called for his car and presented 
his che.ck on Sunday m·orning the attendant did not de-
lin'r the car. The man in charge at the garage "took 
me all through the garage in an effort to locate my car 
and then he told me I couldn't claim it.'' The attendant 
and the manager told :Mr. Squires the car had been 
driven out the night before alhout 11 :50 and that it h.ad 
not been located; that they didn't know where it was; 
that they had reported it to the Police Department of 
Salt Lake City. 
When it is remembered that this testim·ony was of-
fered only for the purpose of showing notice of the prior 
theft and not for the purpose of showing any negligence 
· upon the prior ·occasion it is apparent that the statements 
of the attendant a-nd manager were not hearsay. The 
statements were not offered for the purpose of proving 
the truth of their content, which was not in issue in this 
case. The mere fact of their statements, together with 
the undisputed testim·ony of Squires that he and the at-
tendant went all through the garage in a fruitless effort 
to find his .car, proves the defendant knew of the ~act 
that the ;Squires car was taken out of the garage without 
the claim check being delivered. Perhaps the statements 
of the attendants add nothing to the facts observed and 
testified to by Squires that his car was not in the garage 
when he called for it and if so its adn1ission was harm· 
less, even if the case had be~n tried by a jury. 
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The situation is YPry similar to that before this court 
in the recent case of Goldetl l'. American Keene Cnn('ilf 
& Plaster Co., 95 P. (2d) 755. \Yith respect to the ad-
missibility of certain letters not signed by or on behalf 
of the party against ·whonl they were offered the rou rt 
said (Mr. Justice Pratt): 
''They were not hearsay as they were not offered 
as proof of their content, but were offered as 
proof of a course of conduct indicative of an 
intention to supervise the acts of the Cement 
Company.'' 
With respect to the statements of an ag·ent binding 
the principal : 
"Therefore he (the principal) is bound by the 
conversations of that agent within the scope 
of that agency. That statements are made 
against the interest of the principal is not 
ground for ruling out the answer.'' 
If the view is taken that the statements of the at-
tendants were admissible only if their content was the 
only thing about them of probative value then it is sub-
mitted they are admissible as being within the apparent 
and implied scope of the authority of the agent. Surely 
the attendant on duty at the garage when a person calls 
~or his car and presents a claim che.ck and the car can 
not be found has authority to tell the owner that it had 
been driven out the night before and not located and 
reported to the police. 
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The headnote in Hemminger v. Tri-State Lumber Co. 
(Idaho), 68 P. (2d) 54, states: 
''In libel action based on pulblication of list of 
unsatisfactory accounts compiled by secre-
tary of organization of which defendants 
were members and which allegedly was re-
sponsible for publication, testimony that 
secretary stated to witnesses that number 
be'hind each name on list was number of busi-
nesses that turned name in and that she 
stated from whom she received list held ad-
missible as primary evidence, since secretary 
was, for the special purpose, agent of person£ 
·who caused her to compile and publish list, 
and her statement. stood on same footing as 
if made by defendants.'' 
In Germa11ln v. Huston, 23 N. E. ('2d) 371, the court 
held: 
"While one witness was permitted to testify that 
he reported to defendant's janitor s-ometime 
prior to plaintiff's injury that children had 
been playing wjth and on the rope and .had 
been sliding down same, the court sustamed 
defendant's objections to other ·evidence of-
fered by plaintiff as to previous accidents 
to children playing on the rope as well as to 
complaints mude to and statements of t~e 
janitor concerning children playing wit~ s.a1d 
rope. This evidence was dearly admissible 
and competent to show that defendant knew 
or 1by the exercise of ordinary care could have 
known of the attractive and dangerous charac· 
ter of the rope and pulley apparatus. 'It ha~ 
frequently been held that evidence of othei 
accidents by the same agency in the same con 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
45 
dition is con1petent, not for the purpose of 
showing independent acts of negligence, but 
for the limited purpose of showing that the 
unsafe thing or condition causing the parti-
eular accident caused others, and that the 
occurrence of suc.h other accidents tends to 
show notice to the owner of such dangerous 
agency. M·oore v. Bloomington, De-catur & 
Champaign Railroad Co., 29·5 Ill. 63, 128 N. E. 
721; City of Chicago v. Jarvis, 226 Ill. 614, 
80 N. E. 1079; City of Bloomington v. Legg, 
151 Ill. 9, 37 N. E. 696, 42 Am. St. Rep. 2'16.' 
W olczek Y. Public Service Go., 342 Ill. 482, 
174 N. E. 577, 585." 
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment of the 
trial court should be affirmed. 
Junn, RAY, QuiNNEY & NEBEKER, 
Attorneys f1or Respondent. 
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